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THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATION EXPENSES:
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD?
by
Kathleen M. Weiden* and Helen F. Tomasko**

INTRODUCTION
In his book, The Wealth ofNations, Adam Smith
identifies four canons of taxation, by which to evaluate a tax
system. 1 These canons are: equality, convenience, economy
and certainty. Equality means that a taxpayer is treated fairly
and equitably by the payment of taxes in proportion to his or
her income level. Convenience represents simplicity in
administration ofthe tax system, which impacts compliance.
Economy refers to the collection of tax revenue in the most
cost efficient manner possible. Certainty means the ability of
taxpayers to predict the effect of the tax structure on their
affairs.
Beyond paying taxes in proportion to one's income,
equality should also imply that taxpayers in similar situations
should receive the same treatment under the tax laws. This
paper addresses the issue of equality in practice by examining
the record of judicial and administrative decisions, with respect
to the deductibility of education expenses under § 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C."), across various occupations.

• Assistant Professor of Taxation at Fairfield University. B.S. from Manhattan College, a
M.S., Taxation from Pace University and a Ph.D. from Baruch College of the City University
of New York. Dr. Wciden is also a CPA (New York).
**Candidate for a MBA with Taxation Concentration at Fairfield University. B.S. in
Sociology from Dunbarton College of Holy Cross and is an Enrolled Agent.
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This examination is motivated by the United State Tax
Court ("Tax Court") analysis and holding in an August, 2004
case, Will M McEuen IlL et ux. v. Commissioner 2 on the
deductibility of education expenses under I.R.C. § 162. In
disallowing the taxpayer's expenditures for a Masters of
Business Administration degree ("MBA"), the court concluded
that the taxpayer's educational expenditures were incurred to
meet the minimum educational requirements for the position of
an associate in an investment banking firm, and therefore, were
investments in personal capital, and were non-deductible. In
reaching this conclusion, the court held that the three year
position of analyst (the position from which one could be
promoted to associate) was a "subordinate temporary position" ,
and therefore analysts were not yet engaged in the trade or
business of investment banking, despite being employed by an
investment banking firm. In addition, the court held that the
change in the taxpayer's potential scope of duties, as a result of
additional education, qualified her for a new trade or business,
which also made the education costs nondeductible.
The Tax Court's conclusion that the position of analyst
was a "subordinate temporary position" to the "permanent
career position" of associate raises the following questions.
Across occupations, when are more specialized and/or
responsible positions considered a different trade or business
than positions less specialized and/or responsible? Is there a
basis for taxpayers to argue that the holdings and/or decisions
in this area have resulted in less than equitable treatment across
the various occupations under the tax law?
This paper examines the record ofjudicial and
administrative decisions on the deductibility of education
expenses under § 162, for tax years after 1967, when the
regulations for I.R.C. § 162 were last amended. The paper
considers only decisions where the taxpayer is employed in a
trade or business, in a general sense, prior to incurring
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education costs. Decisions involving a taxpayer obtaining a
bachelor's degree, the teaching profession or foreign nationals
are not considered.
This paper first discusses I.R.C. § 162 and the relevant
regulations. Prior judicial and administrative decisions across
a variety of occupations are then summarized, followed by an
analysis of the decisions as they have been applied across
occupations. The conclusion discusses the implications of, and
questions raised by, this study. It appears that more questions
are raised than answered.

maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his
employment or other trade or business, or (2) meets the express
requirements of the individual's employer, or the requirements
of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the
retention by the individual of an established employment
relationship, status, or rate of compensation." Under Reg.
§ 1.162-5(c)(I), refresher courses, courses dealing with current
developments, and academic and/or vocational courses are
deemed to be education that maintains or improve skills
required in an individual's employment or other trade or
business. Under Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(2), education meets the
express requirements of the individual's employer or the
applicable law or regulation, imposed as a condition of
employment retention, status or rate of compensation, when
there is a bona fide business purpose for the employer to
impose such requirements.
Reg. §1.162-5(b)(1) indicates that when educational
expenditures constitute an investment in the taxpayer's
personal capital, such expenditures are not deductible. Under
Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(i), a taxpayer's expenditures, for an
education that meets the minimum educational requirements
for qualification in his/her employment or other trade or
business, are investments in the taxpayer's personal capital,
and are therefore, nondeductible. The employer's
requirements, applicable law and regulations, as well as
standards of the profession, trade or business involved are all
factors in determining the minimum education required to
qualify for a position or other trade or business. In addition,
the fact that a taxpayer is rendering services in a particular
employment status suggests that the taxpayer has already met
the minimum education requirements. Under Reg. § 1.1625(b)(3), educational expenditures that qualify the taxpayer for a
new trade or business are also considered investments in the
taxpayer's personal capital, and are therefore, nondeductible.

AUTHORITY FOR THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF
EDUCATION EXPENSES
The authority for the deduction of education expenses
is established in I.R.C. § 162(a), which allows for the deduction
of"ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses paid or
incurred during the tax year in carrying on ·a trade or business."
Although I.R.C. § 162(a) provides several examples of
expenses that qualifY for deductibility, it does not provide an
exhaustive list of qualifying expenses. The Regulations under
I.R.C. § 162 are more specific, however, and address a variety
of expenses, including travel, repairs and rentals. Reg. § 1.1625 addresses expenses for education.
For purposes of this article, the first three paragraphs of
Reg. § 1.162-5 are relevant. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) identifies the
general types of educational expenditures that are deductible,
Reg. § 1.162-5(b) identifies the general types of educational
expenditures that are not deductible, and Reg. § 1.162-5(c)
elaborates on the characteristics of deductible educational
expenditures.
Reg. §1.162-5(a) indicates that expenditures made by
an individual for education are deductible, as ordinary and
necessary business expenses," ... if the education (1)

2006 I The Deductibility of Education Expenses I 30

31 I Vol. 16 I North EastJournal of Legal Studies

This regulation further indicates that a change of duties will not
constitute a new trade or business if the new duties involve the
same general type of work performed in the taxpayer's current
position.
As a final consideration, both Reg. §§1.162-5(c) and
1.162-5(b)(1) contain the same caveat. If the education fulfills
the minimum employment requirements for the taxpayer or
qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business, such
expenditures will be treated as investments in personal capital,
and therefore, nondeductible. Thus, in order to successfully
deduct educational expenditures under I.R.C. § 162, taxpayers
must not only demonstrate that the educational expenditures
meet the definition of deductible educational expenditures;
they must also show that those same expenditures do not
constitute investments in personal capital.

commonsense approach to determine whether the taxpayer has
entered a new trade or business. 3 Typically, this means that a
comparison is made ofthe taxpayer's duties before the
education versus the taxpayer's duties after the education so as
to establish lines of demarcation between trades or businesses.
In making this comparison, the courts and/or the IRS have
often relied upon the duties described and permitted under state
licensure law and/or professional certification standards for the
particular occupation ("external determinants of duties"). In
those occupations without applicable state licensure law or
professional certification standards, the courts and/or the IRS
have relied upon the taxpayer's or the employer's own
delineation or description of duties for the particular
occupation ("internal determinants of duties").

External Determinants ofDuties
DETERMINATION OF THE TRADE OR BUSINESS
BOUNDARIES OF CERTAIN OCCUPATIONS

Occupations with Licensure:

Almost without exception, the decisions in this area
begin with the question of whether the occupation-related
education costs meet the standards for non-deductibility under
Reg. § 1.162-5(b), rather than whether they meet the standards
for deductibility under Reg.§ 1.162-5(a). A determination that
educational expenses are non-deductible renders moot the
question of whether the education expenses are deductible.
The majority of the decisions have focused on the standards for
non-deductibility provided in Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3), rather than
those provided in
Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2).
Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) indicates that a change in duties
resulting from further education will not constitute a new trade
or business if the new duties reflect similar responsibilities
prior to the education. The courts and the IRS use a

Despite the fact that the taxpayer was already engaged,
either completely or to a large extent, in a particular field, the
courts generally conclude that moving from unlicensed status
to licensed status in the same field is moving from an existing
trade or business to a new trade or business for purposes of
Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3). This reflects the perception that an
unlicensed taxpayer cannot be performing the same general
duties as a licensed taxpayer, despite being in the same field.
Thus, unlicensed accountants have been denied
deductions for courses required to qualify as a Certified Public
Accountant 4 ("CPA") and for review courses to prepare for the
CPA exam5 . A landscape architect was denied a deduction for
education to qualify him to sit for the Registered Landscape
Architect exam in Massachusetts6 . A law librarian was denied
7
.
8
the costs of law school , as were patent exammers.
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The courts have also generally viewed a taxpayer
moving from one license to another as moving from an existing
trade or business to a new trade or business. These decisions
reflect the notion that changing licenses means changing fields,
and it is not reasonable to assert that the general duties can be
the same for purposes ofReg. §1.162-5(b)(3) when two
different fields are involved.
A CPA engaged in taxation and business planning was
denied deductions for costs of)aw school9, a licensed practical
nurse was denied deductions for costs of education to become a
physician's assistant 10, an attorney was denied deductions for
11
education costs to become a real estate broker , and a nurse
was denied deductions for costs of a degree program in
12
biology, a prerequisite for entrance into medical school.
One decision involves two licenses in the same field. In
Charles A. Robinson 13 , the taxpayer, a licensed practical nurse
("LPN"), deducted the costs incurred in pursuing a program
that would entitle her to sit for the registered nurse ("RN")
examination in Minnesota. The taxpayer argued that the
education maintained or improved her skills in the trade or
business of nursing. The court first reviewed the Minnesota
nursing statutes, which licenses both practical nursing and
registered nursing. The court concluded that the state's
separate licensing of practical and registered nursing was
evidence that Minnesota"... envisions a very definite
qualitative difference between a RN and a LPN." The court
indicated that while the statute identifies some duties as being
identical, RNs possessed certain additional powers that LPNs
did not, such as delegating nursing functions to other nursing
personnel. It should be noted that the court also reviewed the
job descriptions of the positions of LPN and RN at the hospital
where the taxpayer worked part-time during her education, and
concluded that the hospital-employer also viewed an LPN and
a RN as two different trades or businesses. This decision

reflects the notion that the two licenses in the same field must
be two different trades or business because the state regulations
specify two distinct sets of duties.
Occupations with Licensure and Professional Certification:
In Rev. Rul. 74-78 14, the IRS ruled that a dentist
engaged in the full time practice of general dentistry, who
returned to dental school on a full-time basis to study
orthodontics, was entitled to deduct his costs of the
orthodontics education. The taxpayer continued his general
dentistry practice on a part-time basis during the time he was in
dental school, and after the postgraduate education, limited his
practice to orthodontics. The IRS concluded that the costs
incurred for the studies in orthodontics were incurred to
maintain or improve the taxpayer's skills as a dentist, and did
not qualify him to enter a new trade or business. In reaching
this conclusion, the IRS cited Example (4) of Reg. § 1.162S(b)(3)(ii), which indicates that the costs of a program of study
and training for psychoanalysis by a practicing psychiatrist are
deductible, as the program maintains or improves skills
required in the taxpayer's trade or business. Thus, in Rev. Rul.
74-78, the IRS did not deem the practice of general dentistry as
a different trade or business than the practice of orthodonture.
In Iglesias v. Commissioner 15 , the taxpayer, a licensed
general physician and second year resident in psychiatry,
underwent psychoanalysis. As part of the residency, the
taxpayer worked a forty-hour week, one third of which was
spent in classes and two thirds of which was spent in various
patient care activities in the hospital. In addition, the taxpayer
was on call at the hospital for twelve hours per week. The
psychoanalysis was not a requirement of the psychiatry
residency, nor a requirement to become a board-certified
psychiatrist. The Commissioner argued against deductibility of
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the psychoanalysis costs on the grounds that the medical
specialty of psychiatry is a different trade or business than the
trade or business of general medicine. The court declined to
rule on this point. Although the court noted that Example (4)
of Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii) addressed a practicing psychiatrist,
the court concluded that the taxpayer's services rendered as a
psychiatry resident meant he was already engaged in the trade
or business of "a licensed physician treating psychiatric
patients". Since the taxpayer was already engaged as "a
licensed physician treating psychiatric patients", the
psychoanalysis maintained or improved his skills , and
therefore, the costs associated with the psychoanalysis were
deductible.

of an actuarial analyst and an EA or a FSA cannot be the same,
and education costs to become an enrolled actuary or a FSA are
therefore not deductible.

Occupations with Professional Certification:
In Ted Radin 16 , the taxpayer, an actuarial analyst,
endeavored to pass the Society of Actuaries exam. Passing the
initial seven parts of the exam offered by the Society conveys
the title of "Enrolled Actuary" ("EA''), and completion of all
ten parts ofthe exam conveys the title of"Fellow of the
Society of Actuaries" ("FSA"). In the year under issue (1983),
and even now, actuaries are not licensed by the states. The
taxpayer deducted the costs of actuarial books and materials as
well as actuarial examination fees, on the grounds that these
expenses were incurred to maintain his present position and
salary. The court pointed out that an EA can prepare and
submit certain pension plan documents to the Internal Revenue
Service, and that a FSA has additional rights and privileges
beyond those of an EA. Based on these factors, the court
determined that, under professional standards, the services the
taxpayer could provide as an actuarial analyst were different
than those he could render as an EA or a FSA. Since the
professional standards envisioned different services, the duties

Internal Determinants ofDuties
Occupations without Licensure or Professional Certification:
In Albert C. Ruehmann III17, the Commissioner argued
against deductibility of the taxpayer's graduate tax studies on
the basis that the taxpayer had not yet established himself in a
trade or business. The court, however, determined that the
taxpayer's four months of practice as an attorney, after
graduation from law school but prior to entrance into the
master's of tax law program, were sufficient to demonstrate
that the taxpayer had established himself in the trade or
business of practicing law. Since the court found that the
taxpayer had indeed been engaged in a trade or business at the
time the education costs were incurred, the next issue was
whether the education qualified the taxpayer for a new trade or
business. The court was not required to determine whether the
practice of general law and the practice of tax law were two
different trades or businesses, because the Commissioner had
conceded this issue in a reply brief submitted earlier to the
court. By arguing that the education costs should be denied
because the taxpayer had never engaged in a trade or business
(in the Commissioner's opinion, four months was an
insufficient time for a taxpayer to establish a trade or business),
the Commissioner indicated the regulations would permit the
taxpayer's deduction of the costs of obtaining his LL.M. degree
if the taxpayer was already engaged in the practice of law prior
to the education. The IRS apparently made no distinction
between the practice of general law and the practice of tax law.
Since the court found that the taxpayer had engaged in the
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trade or business of law before entering the graduate tax
studies program, the court had no option but to hold that the
education expenses were deductible.
In Stephen G. Sherman 18 , in July 1969, the taxpayer
secured a two year managerial-administrative position with the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service ("AAFES") VietNam
Regional Exchange. The taxpayer's responsibilities included
formulating and monitoring management, contingency and
emergency plans, including the phase-down of exchanges in
conjunction with troop redeployment; personnel management;
and the review and evaluation of major policy and procedures
with respect to inventory control, procurement and distribution.
Additionally, he represented the VietNam region in
discussions regarding planning operations with the Department
of Defense, the Department of State and legislative officials.
In early May 1971, the taxpayer was accepted into the MBA
program at Harvard University, and requested a leave of
absence from the AAFES. The request was denied on the
grounds that his two-year employment term with the AAFES
would expire on July 25, 1971, leaving the taxpayer free to
pursue graduate studies. While denying the leave of absence,
the AAFES encouraged the taxpayer to apply for employment
upon completion of his graduate studies. After the taxpayer's
employment contract with the AAFES terminated in July 1971 ,
the taxpayer entered the MBA program, presumably in
September 1971, and graduated in June 1973. During the two
years the taxpayer was a full time student in the MBA
program, he was not under an employment contract with the
AAFES or any other employer. In late 1972, while still at
Harvard, the taxpayer applied for re-employment at AAFES,
but was denied due to reduced staff needs . Upon graduation
from Harvard in August 1973, taxpayer became Director of
Planning and Research at Radix Corporation. The taxpayer
deducted the costs of his MBA education at Harvard

University. The court concluded that the taxpayer's trade or
business was business administration and that he had been
engaged in the trade or business of business administration
both before (with the AAFES) and after (with Radix
Corporation) the education. Since the taxpayer was engaged in
the same trade or business both before and after the education,
the time during which the taxpayer was unemployed and
completing his education was treated as time spent in the
taxpayer' s trade or business, under the hiatus principle. Since
the Commissioner only argued that the taxpayer had not
established himself in a trade or business before the education,
that the taxpayer was not carrying on a trade or business while
in graduate school and that the taxpayer's suspension from his
trade or business was not temporary or definite, the court
assumed that the education costs otherwise met the standards
of deductibility stipulated in Reg. § 1.162-5 and allowed those
costs as a deduction.
In FrankS. Blair 19, the taxpayer was hired by Sherwin
Williams Co. as a personnel representative after earning her
undergraduate degree on a full time basis. Prior to attending
college, the taxpayer had been a homemaker for fourteen years,
but worked part-time and accumulated the equivalent of five
and one-half years ofbookkeeping and payroll accounting
experience. As a personnel representative, the taxpayer made
hiring recommendations, suggested personnel policy changes,
established salaries for various jobs within the firm and
assisted employees with health and other employee benefits.
In January 1975, the taxpayer entered a two-year part-time
evening MBA program, while continuing to work full time for
Sherwin Williams. When the taxpayer was promoted to
personnel manager in December 1975, her duties became
primarily supervisory. She received a substantial increase in
pay and became responsible for hiring decisions and for the
department budget. The taxpayer received her MBA in
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December 1976. The Commissioner argued that the positions
of personnel representative and personnel manager were two
different trades or business, and that the MBA qualified the
taxpayer for the position of personnel manager. Although the
court noted that a personnel representative could only make
recommendations while a personnel manager could make
decisions, the court also recognized that there was substantial
overlap in the taxpayer's responsibilities as personnel
representative and personnel manager. The court concluded
that neither the acquisition of a new title or the difference with
respect to making recommendations versus making decisions
were sufficient to constitute different duties for purposes of
Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3), and held the educational expenditures
deductible.
In Robert C. Beatt/0 , the taxpayer joined McDonnell
Douglas in January 1972, after receiving bachelor's and
master's degrees in aeronautical engineering. The taxpayer's
title was "Engineer/Scientist Specialist" and his initial
responsibilities primarily involved the design and testing of
technology used to guide, navigate and control aircraft flight.
The taxpayer's career objective was to move into engineering
operations management, by becoming involved in software
integration, which involved the management of the technical
aspects of guidance system development, coordination of the
integration of the guidance system into the flight computer
program, and development of software for testing and
evaluation. These activities required him to coordinate the
work of numerous other engineers within the firm across area
specialties, and to interact with related professionals inside and
outside the firm, as well as resolve conflicts between
individuals, groups and subcontractors. The taxpayer
matriculated in a Master's of Science in Administration
program, which was oriented towards management
administration. In holding the costs of the education
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deductible, the court concluded that the education maintained
or improved the taxpayer's skills in his trade or business,
despite the fact that the bulk of the taxpayer's duties revolved
around engineering responsibilities. The court could not "...
perceive any discrete line of demarcation between the
engineering aspect of his employment and the administrative
role he played in the software integration area; ... " The court
concluded that the education did not qualify the taxpayer for a
new trade or business, because " . . . the studies merely
reflected a change in his duties at McDonnell." That is, the
change in the taxpayer's duties after the education was not
sufficiently different than his duties before the education to be
treated as a new trade or business for purposes of Reg. § 1.1625(b)(3).
In Daniel D. Granger21 , the taxpayer was employed as a
Fifth Key Carrier by a supermarket chain, checking-out
customers, maintaining shelves and ordering inventory. The
Fifth Key Carrier position, on the lower management level of a
retail food establishment, is lower in supervisory and
managerial authority and responsibility than Fourth, Third,
Second and First Key Carrier, where the store manager is First
Key Carrier. The taxpayer worked the night shift at the
supermarket. Since no store manager (First Key Carrier) or
anyone with more supervisory authority was on duty at night,
the taxpayer served as the manager on the night shift. Upon his
own initiative, the taxpayer attended a food marketing
management program, earning a certificate upon completion.
The employer did not require the education, but after obtaining
the certificate, the taxpayer was subsequently promoted
through the ranks to First Key Carrier. The court upheld the
taxpayer's deduction for the costs of the education, finding that
the education"... bore a substantial and direct relationship to
the skills he needed in his ascension in the field of retail food
management." The court concluded that, for purposes of Reg.
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§ 1.162-5(b)(3), the duties of all ranks of Key Carriers were
substantially the same. Interestingly, the court also found that
the education did not qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or
business because the taxpayer, despite holding the title of Fifth
Key Carrier, functioned as a First Key Carrier when he worked
the night shift.
In Owen Gilliam III22 , the taxpayer, a level T-5
employee at Honeywell, deducted costs of college level
courses in business and computer programming. Although not
required, the taxpayer was motivated to take the courses after
his supervisor informed him that taking the college level
courses would improve his chances for promotion. The
taxpayer's principal duties were to program and repair
computers. A promotion to T -6 or C-6 status would still
require him to perform that work, but also allow him to become
involved in management decisions, such as handling reports,
scheduling and planning complex programs. The court
concluded that the college level courses maintained and
improved the taxpayer's skills as a computer programmer, and
also found the taxpayer's testimony credible that a promotion
to grade 6 would involve basically the same skills and
requirements of a grade 5, but with greater responsibilities.
In Private Letter Ruling 9112003, the taxpayer, a
practicing attorney for four years, intended to resign from his
position as associate attorney and return to school to obtain a
master's degree in tax law. During the course of his
employment with two law firms over the four-year period, the
taxpayer did minimal tax-related legal work. The master's in
tax law was expected to take nine months on a full time basis
to complete, after which, the taxpayer intended to return to the
practice of law. The Commissioner cited Ruehmann to
conclude that the master's of tax law merely improves the
taxpayer's skills in his existing trade or business, rather than
qualifies him for a new one. Again, the IRS made no
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distinction between the practice of general law and the practice
of tax law.
In Will M McEuen III, et ux. v. Commissione? 3 , the
taxpayer received an undergraduate degree in economics and
mathematics in 1992, and began working for Merrill Lynch
("Merrill") later that year. The taxpayer's position there was
that of financial analyst. In the financial analyst program, one
could remain for a maximum of three years but an MBA was
required to advance to the position of associate. At the end of
that time with Merrill, the taxpayer had not yet acquired an
MBA, so she left Merrill and accepted an analyst position with
Raymond James Financial, Inc. ("James"). The analyst
program there was of two to three year duration and again, an
MBA was required to become an associate. The record
indicates that analysts and associates were not always assigned
to all of the same securities work. At times, analysts worked
directly with a vice president or a managing director, without
an associate. The record also indicates that the duties of
analyst and associate were, in fact, similar. The court noted
that in the investment banking industry at that time (1995 and
1996), an MBA degree was required for the associate position.
While at James, the taxpayer resigned her position to enroll in
a graduate business program. Upon graduation from the
graduate business program, the taxpayer was accepted into the
"General Management Program" of a home furnishings
manufacturer and became an "associate brand manager".
In claiming deductibility of her educational
expenditures, the taxpayer argued that she was in the
investment banking business and the expenses were incurred to
maintain or improve her skills in the trade or business of
investment banking. Alternatively, she argued that the
expenditures were required to maintain her existing
employment relationship, status or rate of compensation.
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McEuen represents somewhat of a departure from the
other cases reviewed in this paper, in that the court addressed
the standards for non-deductibility in both Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)
and§ 1.162-5(b)(3). In holding for the Commissioner, the
court classified the analyst position as a "subordinate
temporary position", while classifying the associate position as
a "permanent career position", from which one could advance
further through the firm. The court cited corporate literature in
which James identified itself as consisting of "twenty-three
investment bankers and eight financial analysts." The court
inferred from this that James itself did not view analysts as
investment bankers. Based on the classification of the analyst
position as temporary and James' description of the
professional staff, the court concluded that although the
taxpayer was performing investment banking services, she had
not yet met the minimum educational qualification as an
investment banker, and the expenditures for the MBA were
incurred to meet those requirements.
In addition, the court noted that even if the analyst and
associate positions were not two different trades or businesses,
under Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3), the deduction for the education
costs would be denied on the basis that the MBA would enable
the taxpayer to perform significantly different duties and
activities after the education. The change in the taxpayer's
potential scope of duties provided by the education was
sufficient to constitute a new trade or business.

EQUITABLE TREATMENT?
To reach a conclusion on whether the decisions in this
area result in equitable treatment for the various occupations
under the tax law, three questions must be answered:
(1) Do the decisions based on external determinants of
duties result in equitable treatment for various
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occupations, when considering only decisions based
on external determinants of duties?
(2) Do the decisions based on internal determinants of
duties result in equitable treatment for various
occupations, when considering only decisions based
on internal determinants of duties?
(3) Do the decisions result in equitable treatment across
occupations when considering decisions based on
both external and internal determinants of duties?
First, do decisions based on external determinants of
duties result in equitable treatment across various occupations,
when considering only decisions based on external
determinants of duties? For the most part, taxpayers appear to
be equitably treated in decisions involving external
determinants of duties, but an argument could be made that that
dentists and doctors have received preferential treatment
relative to other occupations in terms of the tax deductibility of
their occupation-related education costs.
Under Rev. Rul. 74-78, once a taxpayer qualifies and
practices as a general practice dentist, the costs of an education
to obtain a specialty beyond general dentistry are deductible, as
they are deemed to maintain or improve the taxpayer's trade or
business as a dentist. In other words, under Rev. Rul 74-78,
for purposes of Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3), the duties of a general
practice dentist are the same as the duties of an orthodontist.
Rev. Rul. 74-78 does not address the role of dental board
certification of orthodonture, nor state licensure of dental
specialties.
The American Dental Association recognizes and
regulates nine dental board specialties, and stipulates the
advanced education and experience requirements. 24 Example
(3) of Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii) indicates that a two-week course
reviewing new developments in several medical specialty
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fields are deductible by a general practitioner of medicine,
since the course maintains or improves skills required in the
taxpayer's trade or business. Reg. §1.162-5(c)(1) indicates that
refresher courses or courses dealing with current developments
are deductible, as long as they are not the minimum
requirements to enter the trade or business or to qualify the
taxpayer for a new trade or business. Taxpayers generally
view Example (3) of Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii) and Reg. § 1.1625(c)( 1) as the authority for the deductibility of continuing
professional education courses [e.g., continuing professional
education ("CPE"), continuing medical education ("CME"),
continuing legal education ("CLE"), etc.]. While continuing
education is typically taken by professionals to maintain their
license or professional certification, dental or medical specialty
education is typically undertaken to obtain a new license or
professional certification. It is clear that significant education
and experience is required to obtain a dental board
certification. Given the significant education and experience
requirements for dental board specialty certification, it does not
seem equitable to argue that the education required for board
certification for dentists is the equivalent of the two-week
continuing education course for other occupations
contemplated by Reg. Sec. 1.162-5(b)(3).
The more expansive view of duties for dentists
established by Rev. Rul. 74-78 (particularly when the revenue
ruling notes that the general practice dentist confined her
practice to orthodontics after the education) is to be contrasted
with the narrow view of duties in decisions involving
accountants and landscape architects. The trade or business of
an unlicensed accountant is considered different from a CPA,
because an unlicensed accountant can serve only a portion of
25
clients requiring accounting and tax services. The trade of
business of an unregistered landscape architect is considered a
different from a registered landscape architect, because an
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unregistered landscape architect can service only a portion of
clients requiring landscape architecture services. 26 Dental
patients typically visit their general practice dentist annually or
semi-annually, but seek out dental specialists only when the
need arises. For example, dental patients typically seek the
services of an orthodontist only once. If differences in the
types of clients a taxpayer can serve before the education
versus after the education is indicative of a change in duties for
unlicensed accountants and unregistered landscape architects,
is it equitable to maintain that a general practice dentist is
serving the same patients as an orthodontist?27
If external determinants of duties are relied upon to
decide whether the taxpayer's duties before and after the
education involve the same general type ofwork, are there
differences in the weight placed on the external determinants of
duties applicable to the particular occupation? What is the role
of state licensure and professional certification in deciding if
the taxpayer's duties before and after the education are of the
same general type? Some occupations have licensure only,
while others have licensure and professional certification, and
still others have the latter only.
Orthodontists and general practice dentists are in the
same field (dentistry) and RNs and LPNs are in the same field
(nursing). Orthodontists require additional education beyond
that to become a general practice dentist. RNs require
additional education beyond that of a LPN. Professional
recognition for general practice dentists is conferred by state
license, and for orthodontists, by dental board specialty
certification. Professional recognition for both LPNs and RNs
is conferred by state license. Yet, under Rev. Rul 74-78, the
duties of an orthodontist (board certification) are the same as
the duties of a general practice dentist (license), while,
pursuant to Robinson, the duties of a LPN (license) are not the
same as the duties of a RN (license). If nurses cannot deduct
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the education costs to move from a LPN to a RN license, is it
equitable to allow dentists to deduct the costs of moving from a
DDSIDMD license to a board specialty certification?
In Iglesias, the Commissioner argued that the trade or
business of psychiatry is different from that of general
medicine, and therefore, the taxpayer's costs ofpsychoanalytic
training should not be deductible. Interestingly, this argument
is the opposite of the Commissioner's earlier argument in Rev.
Rul. 74-78, that a specialty field is the same trade or business
as a general field. The Iglesias court declined to decide
whether the trade or business of psychiatry is different from
general medicine. Although the court noted that board
certification did not require the doctor to undergo
psychoanalysis, and that it was not part of the hospital program
in which the taxpayer was a resident, the court did not address
whether completion of the residency in psychiatry was required
before the physician (i.e., a medical doctor or "M.D.") could
hold himself out as a board certified psychiatrist and seek
employment as such.
The Occupational Outlook Handbook of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that
M.D.s seeking board certification in a specialty must complete
a residence in the specialty and pass a final examination for
certification by the American Board of Medical Specialists. A
resident is always under the supervision of, and is responsible
to, a supervising physician educator of the same specialty in
the hospital. The latter must certify that the resident has
satisfactorily completed the residency program as part of the
board certification process.
Although the taxpayer in Iglesias was a licensed general
physician by the second year of his residency, it was unclear
whether he practiced as a general physician before beginning
his psychiatry residency. This is an interesting omission
because the simple holding of a license does not necessarily
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mean that the taxpayer practices in that occupation. The
deductions permitted under I.R.C. §162 are allowed only when
they incurred in conjunction with the carrying on of a trade or
business. The Iglesias court found that the taxpayer's
psychiatric patient services during the residency period were
sufficient to consider the taxpayer already engaged in the trade
or business of "a licensed physician treating psychiatric
patients". In other words, the court preferred to characterize
Iglesias' services required as part of his residency as the
equivalent of carrying on a trade or business, rather than as the
practical experience prerequisite to enter it. While the taxpayer
of Rev. Rul. 74-78 had practiced general dentistry before
commencing the orthodonture education, it appears that
taxpayer in Iglesias did not practice general medicine before
his psychiatry residency program. If he had, the court would
have been able to rely upon Rev. Rul. 74-78, and would not
have needed to characterize the practical experience
component of the residency program as the carrying on of a
trade or business. If Iglesias was already engaged in the trade
or business of a licensed physician treating psychiatric patients,
and therefore his costs of psychoanalysis were deductible, then,
following Rev. Rul. 74-78, would not the education costs of his
psychiatric residency, if any, also be deductible? This point
was never brought up by the court or the taxpayer.
Taxpayers in occupations other than medicine have
generally not been permitted to treat the practical experience
prerequisite for licensure or professional certification as the
equivalent of carrying on a trade or business. Consider the
following: (1) a medical resident must have completed
medical school in order to enter a specialty residency program,
and an unlicensed accountant must have completed, generally,
an undergraduate degree in accounting to obtain a position in a
public accounting firm; (2) a resident must accumulate the
required number of specialty hours (both in the classroom and
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the hospital) of the residency program, and an unlicensed
accountant must accumulate, generally, twenty-four months of
attestation practical experience; (3) the resident must complete
the residency under the supervision of physician-educators, and
an unlicensed accountant must complete the practical
experience requirement under the supervision of CPAs; (4) the
resident must pass an examination at the end of the residency
to become board certified, and an unlicensed accountant must
pass an examination to become state certified; (5) both the
resident and the unlicensed accountant are paid for the services
they render. Despite these similarities, Iglesias indicates that a
psychiatric resident is already considered engaged in the trade
or business of a licensed physician treating psychiatric patients,
while Cooper and other earlier decisions indicate that an
unlicensed accountant is not considered already engaged in the
trade or business of public accounting, while performing the
services of a licensed accountant under the supervision of a
CPA. Given that public accounting work experience prior to
licensure is not considered the carrying on of the trade or
business of a CPA, is it equitable to treat the practical
experience acquired during a medical specialty residency as the
carrying on of a trade or business, particularly when the
taxpayer has not carried on any trade or business before the
residency?
Second, do decisions based on internal determinants of
duties result in equitable treatment across various occupations,
when considering only decisions based on internal
determinants of duties? While, for the most part, taxpayers in
decisions involving internal determinants of duties appear to be
equitably treated across occupations, this review suggests,
however, that an argument could be made that certain
occupations have received preferential treatment relative to
other occupations in terms of the tax deductibility of their
occupation-related education costs.
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What constitutes a "sufficient" amount of time for a
taxpayer to become established in a trade or business seems to
depend upon the taxpayer's occupation. Although neither
I.R. C. § 162 nor the regulations there under identify the amount
of time spent in a particular employee or self employed
position as a determinant of whether a taxpayer has established
himself in a trade or business, the courts and the IRS do
consider this factor. In Ruehmann, the court concluded that the
taxpayer's four months of practice as an attorney during the
summer between graduation from law school and entrance into
a graduate tax program, were sufficient to show that the
taxpayer had established himself in a trade or business prior to
incurring the education costs in question. In contrast, in
McEuen, the court concluded that, because the taxpayer's two
employers had "up or out" policies (i.e., the employee must
complete a MBA within three years of hire, or leave), the
taxpayer's approximately five years of experience as an analyst
could not be counted as time spent in the trade or business of
investment banking before incurring the costs of an education
required for promotion. If the four months between graduation
from law school and graduate tax law school is a sufficient
amount of time to establish the taxpayer in a trade or business,
is it equitable to say that an analyst's five years of experience
with two investment banking firms had not established her in a
trade or business?
Although neither I.R.C. § 162 nor the related regulations
specify how to handle employment arrangements with fixed
terms, the issue of fixed employment terms also seems to
depend upon the taxpayer's occupation. In Sherman, the Tax
Court concluded that the taxpayer's two year fixed term of
employment with the AAFES was sufficient to show that the
taxpayer had established himself in the trade or business of
business administration, even though the taxpayer was
unemployed from the expiration of his employment contract
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until he commenced graduate business school. The taxpayer
took a position in private industry upon graduation, but
whether the taxpayer's new position as Director of Planning
and Research required a MBA or not was never addressed. In
contrast, in McEuen, the court concluded that, because the
taxpayer's term of employment at each of two employer firms
was limited to three years unless the taxpayer earned a MBA
degree, the taxpayer's combined five years of experience as an
analyst did not establish her in the trade or business of
investment banking before incurring the education costs. If a
two-year term employment with the AAFES is sufficient to
establish the taxpayer in the trade or business or business
administration, is it equitable to say that five years as an
analyst with two investment banking firms was a temporary
position?
Third, do decisions result in equitable treatment across
occupations when considering decisions based on both external
and internal determinants of duties? In Iglesias and McEuen,
both taxpayers had positions with three year "up or out" terms.
McEuen's position as analyst required her to successfully
complete a MBA program by the end of the three-year term in
order to continue and be promoted to associate. Iglesias'
position as psychiatric resident required him to successfully
complete the residency program by the end of the three year
term, the total years of residency required for board
28
certification as a psychiatrist. Residents who fail to complete
either the prerequisite training or the exams cannot become
board certified. Both taxpayers sought positions that require a
combination of practical and educational experiences. The
position of associate implicitly requires acceptable
performance in the practical on-the-job training at the firm, and
explicitly requires educational training. The position of board
certified psychiatrist implicitly requires acceptable
performance in the practical on-the-job training at the hospital,

and explicitly requires educational training. Both taxpayers
were compensated for the time spent in acquiring the necessary
prerequisite practical experience.
The McEuen court, however, relying upon Reg.
§ 1.162-5(b)(2), held that, although McEuen was performing
investment banking services, she had not yet met the minimum
education requirements for qualification in that trade or
business. In contrast, the Iglesias court held that the taxpayer's
time spent working in the hospital as a psychiatric resident was
time spent in the trade or business of a "licensed physician
treating psychiatric patients". The Iglesias court made no
mention of Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2) and seemed to ignore the fact
that, although the taxpayer was rendering psychiatric services
to patients, he had not yet met the minimum requirements to
qualify as a board certified psychiatrist.
CONCLUSION
Employment-related education costs can be significant
for many taxpayers, and deductibility of those costs can ease
the financial burden. Taxpayers must be able to demonstrate
that those educational costs not only meet the standards for
deductibility, but also do not run afoul of the standards for nondeductibility. However, in relying upon the record ofiRS and
court decisions, taxpayers may find that the record contains
inconsistencies and inequities.
This paper has reviewed the record of IRS and court
decisions with respect to the deductibility of employmentrelated education costs under I.R.C. § 162. In making a
comparison of the taxpayer' s duties before and after the
education (as a means of determining whether the taxpayer has
remained in the same trade or business or has qualified to enter
a new trade or business), the courts rely, when possible, upon
external determinants of the taxpayer's duties, such as state
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licensure and/or professional certifications, or upon internal
determinants of the taxpayer's duties, such as the taxpayer's or
employer's own delineation or description of duties. The
analysis of the treatment accorded taxpayers across various
occupations suggests that taxpayers in certain occupations have
received preferential treatment with respect to the deductibility
of their education costs relative to taxpayers in other
occupations.
A number of questions remain. What is the role of
external determinants of duties when more than one applies to
a particular occupation? This is an important issue for
occupations such as dentist and doctors, which involve a state
license and either board certification or a second license. What
is, or should be, the weight accorded each of the external
determinants? What happens when a state institutes licensing
of a dental or medical specialty that previously was only board
certified? Does it alter the deductibility of education related
costs? What about situations where the character of the
practice before the education differs from the character of the
practice after the education? Is the practice of general dentistry
the same as a practice focused exclusively on orthodontics (i.e.,
Rev. Rul. 74-78)? Is the practice of general law the same as a
practice focused exclusively on tax law (i.e. PLR 9112003)? Is
obtaining orthodontic training the same thing as undergoing
psychoanalysis? Example (4) of Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii)
indicates that the costs of a program of study and training for
psychoanalysis by a practicing psychiatrist are deductible, as
the program maintains or improves skills required in the
taxpayer's trade or business. Rev. Rul. 74-78 and Iglesias,
among other decisions, cite Example (4) of Reg. Sec. 1.1625(b)(3)(ii) in concluding that the taxpayer's education costs
were deductible as they are deemed to be incurred to maintain
or improve the taxpayer's trade or business skills.
Psychoanalysis is a therapy employed by psychiatrists,

psychologists and social workers as part of psychological
counseling to identify the unconscious factors that affect
behavior and emotions. Conversely, state law prohibits anyone
who is not part of the field of dentistry from practicing
orthodonture
The regulations under Sec. 162 were last amended in
1967, when the United States economy was more an industrial
economy than the service economy it is today. It is likely since
1967, the increased role of services-type occupations in the
economy has been accompanied by a growth in the number of
members of professional organizations and boards, as well as a
significant increase in the number of occupations, specialties
and sub-specialties licensed by states and/or certified by
professional organizations or boards. It may be time for
Congress to review Section 162 as it applies to employmentrelated education costs.
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